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On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal, hereinafter referred to as the Court of Appeal, in a lead judgment, delivered by Uthman Mohammed, J.C.A. to which Coker and Nnaemeka-Agu. JJ.C.A. concurred, allowed the appeal and quashed the information.
It was in consequence of this decision of the Court of Appeal that the appellant wrote a letter to the Attorney-General of Lagos State on 8th May, 1979, wherein he requested for the prosecution of the respondents for the offences of conspiracy to bring false accusations against the appellant, contrary to s.125 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 31) Laws of Lagos State and conspiracy to injure the appellant in his "trade or profession by maliciously procurring the seizure and detention of the properties of his clients contrary t s.518(4) of the Criminal Code. The Attorney-General of Lagos State, by a letter dated 9th January 1980, declined to accede to the request of the appellant.
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal, hereinafter referred to as the Court of Appeal, in a lead judgment, delivered by Uthman Mohammed, J.C.A. to which Coker and Nnaemeka-Agu. JJ.C.A. concurred, allowed the appeal and quashed the information.
It was in consequence of this decision of the Court of Appeal that the appellant wrote a letter to the Attorney-General of Lagos State on 8th May, 1979, wherein he requested for the prosecution of the respondents for the offences of conspiracy to bring false accusations against the appellant, contrary to s.125 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 31) Laws of Lagos State and conspiracy to injure the appellant in his "trade or profession by maliciously procurring the seizure and detention of the properties of his clients contrary t s.518(4) of the Criminal Code.
The Attorney-General of Lagos State, by a letter dated 9th January 1980, declined to accede to the request of the appellant.
The appellant thereupon decided to initiate a private prosecution against the respondents. The first respondent was the Director of Public Prosecutions at the material time while the second and third respondents were the police officers who investigated the case that was brought against the appellant. The appellant filed his papers for this private prosecution on 11th April, 1980. The papers contained among others, the information and the proof of evidence which he intended to rely upon for the prosecution of the respondents. He also paid the necessary deposit in compliance with the law.
Now, on 9th June, 1980 following the action of the appellant, as aforesaid, the attorney-General of Lagos Stale filed a nolle prosequi in the action.
Though the criminal information was listed for hearing in the High Court of Lagos State before Oladipo Williams, J. on 10th June 1980, on that day, the learned judge only took arguments on the propriety of the nolle prosequi which was filed the case by the Attorney-General. And after Mr. Adefioye, the learned counsel presenting the Attorney-General, the appellant and the first respondent had severally made various submissions on this issue to the court, the court decided to rise for the purpose of writing the ruling in the case.
This ruling was given by the learned judge on the same day. He upheld the sub-missions of Mr. Adefioye and the 1st respondent on the notice of nolle prosequi filed by the Attorney-General and discharged the respondents.
The appellant who was dissatisfied with this ruling appealed to the Court of Ap-peal on the ground that the trial court should have taken evidence and examined his allegations, against the Attorney-General, of malice and extraneous consider-ation, in pursuance of the provisions of s.191 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979
In their judgment, delivered by Kazeem, J.C.A. the Court of Appeal held that by virtue of sub-section (3) of s.191 of the 1979 Constitution, the position in Nigeria is now different from the position at common law and also under the provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 1963 No.20, which is hereinafter referred to as the 1963 Constitution; Kazeem, J.C.A. said: "It was decided in R. vs. Comptroller-General of Patents (1899) 1 Q.B. 909 40 at page 914 that in England when the Attorney-General is exercising his functions as an officer of the Crown such functions were not subject to review by the Court of Queen’s Bench Division or any other court. But in this country the powers of the Attorney-General are provided for under sec. 191 of the 1979 Constitution as follows:-
The main issue raised for determination is one of locus standi. Have the...